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Abstract
Using a game theoretical setting, this paper studies how a multinational company’s
(MNC) choice of using one set (OSB) or two sets of books (TSB) is affected by a strate-
gically acting tax auditor (TA). First, a divisionalized MNC with a producing division in a
low tax country and a selling division in a high tax country chooses either OSB or TSB.
With OSB, the unique transfer price coordinates the quantity decision and determines the
tax payments. With TSB, two transfer prices are used for both tasks. Second, a TA may
audit the MNC’s transfer prices.
It turns out that the TA’s bargaining power and his personal audit costs critically influ-
ence the MNC’s transfer pricing decision. For a low bargaining power and low audit costs,
the MNC keeps OSB with positive probability. When the TA’s bargaining power is high,
the negotiation benefits from using a single transfer price are outweighed by the costs of
a reduced flexibility. Then, the MNC keeps TSB with either tax aggressive or compliant
reported transfer prices. In addition, a raise in the tax difference induces less tax aggressive
behavior. Intuitively, tax aggressiveness should be even more attractive in this case. This
intuition is not true in our setting since the TA’s audit probability increases and, thus, makes
profit shifting less attractive.
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1 Introduction
The prevailing use of profit shifting devices such as debt financing structures or transfer prices is
non-controversial. This is not in the interest of governments and tax authorities. In order to pre-
vent unintended tax savings the tax authorities and governments started to become aware how
tax regulation and enforcement affects taxpayers’ behavior. According to EY’s Global Trans-
fer Pricing Survey 2013, transfer pricing remains to be a main issue of controversy between
MNCs and tax authorities. The importance of addressing the unintended use of transfer pricing
mechanisms for tax saving reasons is also highlighted by the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project of the OECD. One fourth of the BEPS action areas especially concern transfer
pricing topics. Several parts of the other action areas also affect transfer prices. One goal of the
OECD’s efforts concerning the documentation of transfer pricing and country-by-country re-
porting is to help tax authorities to most effectively deploy their audit resources (OECD, 2015,
p. 9).
The transfer price information stems from the MNC’s accounting system. Previous research
illustrated that an MNC may either keep one set of books (OSB) or two sets of books (TSB).
An accounting system comprising only OSB uses one transfer price both internally and exter-
nally (Göx and Schiller, 2006; Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller, 2012). With TSB the MNC
uses two separate transfer prices, one for internal and the other for tax purposes. Springsteel
(1999) finds that 77 percent out of a best practice group of large companies choose TSB. The
detection of differing internal and tax transfer prices by the tax auditor (TA) may, if sufficiently
different, undermine the economic credibility, hence leading to costly regulatory intervention
(Narayanan and Smith, 2000, p. 507). For two separate transfer prices, comprehensive disclo-
sure requirements impose additional costs on the firms for concealing the second set of books
from the tax authority (Martini, 2015, p. 873). Moreover, a second set of books implies higher
costs due to extra documentation and hence, administrative expenses rise (EY, 2013; Nielsen
and Raimondos-Møller, 2012). In addition to the extra administrative and documentation costs
of keeping a second set of books, the possibility of detection and intervention by the TA might
further reduce the value of TSB (Smith, 2002a, p. 224). Companies argue that implementing
TSB will invite increasing scrutiny by tax authorities (EY, 2003). Mills (1998) already points
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out that book-tax differences create red flags for the IRS. She finds empirical evidence that
the audit adjustments proposed by the IRS are increasing when the book-tax difference rises.
Finding TSB in case of a tax audit is similar. If an audit takes place, the TA learns a possibly
existing internal income due to the use of an internal transfer price. Previous research regularly
assumed that the TA accepts any transfer price as long as it lies in a specific range that com-
plies with the arm’s length principle (for example Baldenius et al. (2004)). In the light of the
recent developments concerning TAs’ awareness of tax evasion, TAs seem to act strategically.
TAs face a trade-off between audit costs and additional tax revenues when they audit an MNC’s
transfer prices and related books. These revenues may be gained due to the possible detection of
non-compliance with the arm’s length principle and henceforth adjusting the accepted transfer
prices. The conjecture arises that an MNC considers the existing tax regulation and the enforce-
ment through strategically acting TAs for the decision regarding the use of OSB or TSB. This
leads us to the following research questions: (1) When will MNCs decide to use OSB or TSB
in equilibrium? (2) Which factors influence the decision?
We examine these questions using a dynamic game of incomplete information with two players,
namely the MNC and the TA. The MNC comprises a producing foreign division in a low tax
jurisdiction and a selling domestic division in a high tax country. Transfer pricing is used for
two purposes. On the one hand, the transfer price affects the quantity decision of the selling
division’s manager by internalizing the costs for the intermediate product obtained from the
producing division. Thus, the transfer price is used by the MNC to adapt the selling division’s
objective, i.e. the division profit, according to the MNC’s objective, the total profit. In a world
without taxes, the optimal transfer price is set equal to marginal costs of the producing division
(Hirshleifer, 1956). On the other hand, in a world with taxes, transfer pricing enables the MNC
to shift profits from the high tax country to the low tax country. Thus, the MNC reduces its tax
payments which directly increases its total profit. With TSB, the MNC can separately optimize
both the internal and the tax effect of transfer pricing (Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller, 2012).
As a consequence, TSB allow the MNC a finer optimization than OSB. However, in addition
to the extra administrative and documentation costs for keeping a second set of books, the
implementation of TSB instead of OSB may weaken the MNC’s bargaining power in case of
a tax audit. In particular, by choosing an external transfer price belonging to the appraised
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range of acceptable arm’s length prices (compliance range), an MNC avoids a transfer pricing
adjustment in case of a tax audit. We extend former research by considering two different types
of MNCs with two differing compliance ranges. That is, an MNC with low marginal costs faces
a different range than an MNC with high marginal costs. Thus, the compliance range depends
on the MNC’s marginal costs. However, the marginal costs are not ex ante observable by the
TA. Neither is the MNC’s compliance ex ante verifiable. Hence, a low cost MNC might have
an incentive to mimic a high marginal cost type. If a tax transfer price not belonging to the
appraised compliance range is detected during the tax audit, the MNC and the TA negotiate
about the applicable transfer price.
With TSB and detected non-compliance, the use of a second transfer price for internal purpuses
is interpreted as evidence for the MNC’s strong tax saving behavior. As a consequence, the TA
enforces a tax transfer price belonging to the MNC’s appraised compliance range. In contrast,
OSB provides a convincing argument in case of litigation. The MNC uses the same transfer
price for internal coordination as well as for tax purposes. Hence, a court may find the inap-
propriateness of TA’s appraised compliance range. Therefore, with OSB, the reported transfer
price influences the outcome of the negotiation and the TA might enforce a tax transfer price
that does not belong to the appraised compliance range. In sum, for choosing between OSB and
TSB the MNC faces a trade-off between flexibility in using transfer pricing for both internal
and tax purposes and its bargaining power in a tax audit. This is in line with the recognition that
differences in book and tax incomes may weaken the tax payer’s position in audits (Mills, 1998,
p. 345). In order to abstract from potential legal disputes between the TA and the MNC, the TA
enforces the highest transfer price belonging to the appraised compliance range when TSB are
kept. Any transfer price of this range fulfills the arm’s length principle. The MNC accepts the
highest transfer price of this range without objection.
We find that the bargaining power of the TA determines the equilibrium strategies. Our results
show that if this power is high, OSB is no longer part of an equilibrium strategy. The intuition
is as follows. If the bargaining power of the TA is high, the advantage of OSB compared to TSB
diminishes. Thus, TSB is chosen because of the higher flexibility for internal coordination.
The level of audit costs of the TA also affects the equilibrium strategies. For a low level of
audit costs, the TA will conduct an audit more frequently. Thus, the probability of detecting
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non-compliance increases and a transfer pricing report due to tax saving motives becomes less
attractive to the firm. Then, the MNC tends to keep TSB with a reported transfer price belonging
to the true compliance range in equilibrium.
In addition, the findings in our paper show that for an increasing tax difference between the
two countries the probability for using TSB in order to shift profits to the low tax jurisdiction
decreases. This result seems to be counterintuitive because profit shifting should be especially
important in a situation where the tax rate differential is high. This finding is due to the TA’s
awareness of the high tax savings potential. High tax savings possibilities come along with
an increased scrutiny by the TA. This is incorporated by the MNC while making the transfer
pricing decisions.
Most of the existing research investigates the interrelation between an internal and an external
transfer price when the accounting system has already been designed (for example Baldenius
et al. (2004) and Martini et al. (2012)). We extend former research by addressing the question
whether tax regulation and strategically acting TAs can affect the choice of keeping OSB or
TSB. Hence, in contrast to previous work, the choice of the accounting system is endogenous.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section the related literature is discussed. Then, the
model is described, before the equilibrium analysis is presented and discussed in section 4. This
discussion is followed by considerations regarding comparative statics. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2 Literature Review
A comprehensive overview concerning international transfer prices and its functions is provided
by Sansing (2014). We focus on the literature which incorporates the trade-off between internal
coordination and tax minimization. MNCs regularly incorporate differences in tax and tariff
rates as additional aspect in their transfer pricing decision, see for example Schjelderup and
Sorgard (1997) or Smith (2002a). Prior research has already shown that MNCs may use trans-
fer prices as a device to shift profits from high to low tax jurisdictions. Particularly, existing
research illustrates that the use of TSB is preferable against using a single price for internal and
external purposes when an MNC’s tax and incentive objectives are conflicting (Lemus, 2011, p.
3). The intuition of this result is straightforward. Keeping OSB necessarily contains a trade-off
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between the conflicting objectives of tax minimization and quantity distortion. Narayanan and
Smith (2000) find that tax adjusted marginal costs balances the conflicting objectives for a sin-
gle set of books. In a TSB setting, Baldenius et al. (2004) obtain a similar result. They show
that tax adjusted marginal costs should be used for internal purposes, while the external transfer
price is straightforward the maximum of the compliance range accepted by the TA. However,
these results ignore the potential case of non-compliance with the arm’s length principle. Kant
(1988), Smith (2002a), Hyde and Choe (2005), and Choe and Hyde (2007) show that a corner
solution is no longer straightforward when adjustments by the TA are taken into account. Fur-
thermore, Eden et al. (2005) show that the threat of transfer pricing penalties may already have
extensive impacts on the targeted firms. In addition, fiscal authorities are modernized to ensure
a government’s fair share of corporate taxes (Elliott and Emmanuel, 2000, p. 216). Despite
numerous governments’ quests for higher tax payments, previous research has not considered
the TA as strategic party. However, already Cools and Emmanuel (2006) highlight the necessity
of taking into account fiscal regulations as an endogenous variable.
Capuzzi (2010) points out that the TA as well as MNCs can use the arm’s length principle to
increase their incomes by interpreting it in their favor. Wagenhofer (1994), Raimondos-Møller
and Scharf (2002), as well as Keuschnigg and Devereux (2013) challenge the appropriateness
of the arm’s length principle in general. They argue that MNCs prevail in markets where they
dominate trades between unrelated parties. In addition, Samuelson (1982) finds that MNCs are
able to manipulate the arm’s length limits. The arm’s length principle is applied in nearly all
countries with transfer pricing restrictions. Picciotto (1992) gives a detailed overview of the
arm’s length implementation and its historical development. Nevertheless, all of these papers
take the decision whether to keep OSB or TSB as given. An exception is the work of Nielsen
and Raimondos-Møller (2012). They investigate whether there might exist situations in which
keeping OSB is preferable. However, their main research area is the field of interdependences
between different transfer prices.
By applying the formula apportionment approach independence among different transfer prices
might be obtained (Hyde and Choe, 2005). However, Martini et al. (2012) have already shown
that under a formula apportionment approach MNCs have incentives to shift the tax base by
adjusting investment levels. In contrast to affected investment levels, MNCs use ex post in-
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come shifting with separate entities and transfer prices. They conclude that neither the formula
apportionment approach nor the separate entity approach is always preferable. Despite these
advantages and drawbacks regarding the tax regime, in almost all countries the single entity
approach is applied. Therefore, we restrict our attention to taxation in terms of the separate
entity approach.
Wagenhofer (1994) shows that cost based transfer pricing might induce first best solutions for
internal purposes when there is asymmetric information between the participating divisions.
We assume that an MNC’s marginal cost plus an appropriate mark-up is the upper bound of
the appraised compliance range. During the negotiation between the TA and the MNC, the
applicable transfer price is determined. This transfer price might be greater than the upper
bound of the appraised compliance range and includes a bargaining mark-up.
Keeping OSB or TSB when imperfect competition prevails is much better examined. Schjelderup
and Sorgard (1997), Arya and Mittendorf (2008), Dürr and Göx (2011), and Lemus (2011) in-
vestigate whether OSB or TSB is preferable in a situation of imperfect competition. In their
studies, a single transfer price additionally serves as a commitment device to soften competi-
tion in external markets. The results heavily depend on whether competitors are able to observe
the use of a single transfer price or not. The accounting system cannot be used to influence
competitors when the number of books is non-observable. In contrast to this literature, we as-
sume that the TA is not able to observe whether OSB or TSB has been chosen. Neither of these
studies include a strategic TA in their considerations. Moreover, most of the existing research
does not consider the possibility of tax audits at all. One exception are Diller and Lorenz (2016).
They extend the work of Baldenius et al. (2004) by examining a strategically acting TA. In line
with former research, they take an MNC’s decision whether to keep OSB or TSB as given. They
assume the superiority of TSB because of the higher flexibility.
While taking a strategically acting TA into account one should bear in mind the possibility that
some of the income shifting is tacitly tolerated by the government. It heightens the competi-
tiveness of the jurisdiction. This is the rationale why TAs have some leeway while enforcing
transfer pricing adjustments. Actually, transfer pricing regulation itself may act as a strategic
device (Mansori and Weichenrieder, 2001, p. 1). This opinion is confirmed by the theoreti-
cal findings of Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (2002) and Smith (2002b). They showed that ex
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post discretion over transfer prices may relieve ex ante distortions. Thus, lax transfer pricing
regulations and enforcement may even lead to higher tax revenues in the low and the high tax
jurisdiction.
3 Model Description
We consider an MNC operating in a low and a high tax jurisdiction. In contrast to former
research, we endogenize the MNC’s choice of the accounting system while taking into account
a strategic TA. We consider a situation where the MNC decides whether to keep OSB or TSB.
During a potential tax audit non-compliance of the used transfer price might be detected. For
the sake of simplicity, we restrict our attention to two strategically acting players, namely the
TA in the high tax country and the MNC.
3.1 Multinational Company
The MNC comprises a producing foreign division and a selling domestic division. In particular,
the foreign division produces an intermediate product which is transformed to the final product
by the domestic division. Without loss of generality, the domestic division’s production costs are
set equal to zero. There exists no external market for the intermediate product. The producing
foreign division could face either high marginal costs cH with probability β or low marginal
costs cL with 1− β , where 0 < β < 1 and 0 ≤ cL < cH . The MNC observes the realized
marginal costs at the beginning of the period. The TA knows the ex ante probability β and
can observe the realized marginal costs during an audit. For any level of them, the MNC faces
constant marginal costs. Hence, we abstract from any economies of scale or scope.
Per unit of intermediate good provided by the producing foreign division the selling domestic
division pays an internal transfer price pi. We assume administered transfer pricing. In particu-
lar, the headquarters chooses transfer prices in order to achieve congruence between the division
managers’ objectives (divisional profit) and the MNC’s objective (global after-tax profit). The
foreign division is located in a low tax jurisdiction, where its income is taxed at a rate t. Further-
more, the domestic division operates in a high tax jurisdiction with income tax rate t+h, where
0 ≤ t, h ≤ 1 and t + h ≤ 1. The parameter h captures the tax rate differential between the low
and high tax jurisdiction. We assume taxation in terms of the source principle. Thus, the tax
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liability of each division is determined by the division’s income. Hence, the MNC is interested
in a high external transfer price for tax purposes in order to shift as much income as possible
into the low tax jurisdiction. As Baldenius et al. (2004) we allow negative pre-tax income for
the foreign division.
We consider a monopolistic setting. The revenue function is given by R(q) =
(
a− 12q
)
q, where
q denotes the demanded quantity with a≥ cH .1 The manager of the domestic division is evalu-
ated on the basis of pre-tax divisional profit.2 Considering the internal transfer price the selling
domestic division maximizes:
ΠD =
(
a− 1
2
q
)
q− piq.
The MNC’s divisions are legally separate entities. Therefore, the domestic division chooses the
quantity in order to maximize its profits:
qD = a− pi.
For tax purposes, the MNC may choose to use a transfer price that is different from the internal
transfer price pi. Nevertheless, the MNC can also decide to report the internal transfer price to
the TA. Thus, the reported transfer price depends on whether OSB or TSB was chosen. For the
sake of simplicity, we do not consider extra administrative and documentation costs for keeping
TSB. It is straightforward that OSB becomes preferable, if the costs for keeping a second set of
books become sufficiently high.3 Ex ante the TA cannot verify whether the MNC keeps OSB
or TSB. He only observes the reported transfer price pr.
We assume in line with the extensive documentation requirements imposed on MNCs that in
the case of a tax audit, the TA observes the realized marginal cost, and the internally used
1 For the sake of simplicity we assume a is sufficiently large. In particular, a is so large that a low cost type MNC
keeping OSB finds it optimal to set pr = pr.
2 Other authors assume that the divisions maximize their after-tax profits. This assumption is also ad hoc in the
transfer pricing setting. Baldenius et al. (2004) explicitly point out this fact and refer to the circumstance that some
firms evaluate their divisional managers on a pre-tax basis. For further discussion about the advantage of pre- vs.
after-tax profit maximization for divisional performance measurement see Nielsen and Raimondos-Møller (2012).
3 If keeping TSB is costly OSB will occur more often in equilibrium. In fact, we strengthen our findings regarding
OSB by neglecting the extra documentation and administrative costs for keeping a second set of books. If TSB
becomes more expensive there is a shift to OSB. Even while ignoring these additional costs OSB is part of an
equilibrium strategy.
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transfer price when TSB are kept. The comprehensive documentation requirements stem from
the OECD guidelines which serve in many countries as a kind of soft law as well as national
requirements.4 In line with the OECD guidelines and the monopolistic setting, the transfer price
is set using a cost plus method. According to this transfer pricing method, marginal costs plus an
appropriate mark-up fulfill the needs of the arm’s length principle. Hence, the appraised upper
bound for the reported transfer price of a low cost type MNC is given by pr = cL+mL, where
mL ≥ 0 captures the accepted mark-up. Hence, the appraised arm’s length compliance range for
a low cost MNC is given by
[
0, pr
]
. The same arguments hold true for the high cost type. Thus,
during an audit, the TA recognizes compliance with the arm’s length principle when an MNC
with c = cH sets its external transfer price equal to marginal costs plus an adequate mark-up
mH ≥ 0, i.e. pr = cH +mH , where pr > pr. Moreover, we assume mH ≤ mL− cH + cL δ (t+h)δ (t+h)−h
in order to ensure pi ≤ pr. In particular, with this assumption we exclude any negotiation
incentives concerning the mark-up when a compliant TSB strategy is chosen.5 Therefore, the
appraised arm’s length compliance range for the high cost type is described by [0, pr]. Hence,
for any realized marginal costs, the MNC might choose its reported transfer price from the range
[0, pr]. However, this range does not necessarily comply with the arm’s length principle. The
low cost MNC has an incentive to mimic the high cost firm. If a low cost MNC uses pr ∈ (pr, pr]
to calculate its taxable income, the TA will find non-compliance during an audit.
We summarize the MNC’s possibilities of different strategy combinations in the following.
After marginal costs are realized, the MNC has to decide on the accounting regime and which
prices have to be applied. The possible strategies are depicted in figure 1.
4 For example, this assumption is in accordance with German tax treaties where firms have to provide documents that
are relevant for the transfer pricing calculations. This is also the case for documents that are fully concerned with
internal calculations. These do not have to comply with tax regulations or accounting standards (BMF 12.04.2005).
5 The mark-up for the low cost type mL and for the high cost type mH can have the same value. mL 6= mH is not
necessary for obtaining the results of this paper.
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c j
MNC chooses OSB
pr ∈ [0, pr ]
pr ∈ (pr, pr)
pr =
pr
MN
C c
hoo
ses
TS
B
pi ∈ [0,+∞) , pr ∈ [0, pr ]
pi ∈ [0,+∞) , pr ∈ (pr, pr)
pi ∈ [0
,+∞)
, pr =
pr
Figure 1: Possible strategy choices for an MNC with marginal costs c j, where j = H,L
In the case of a tax audit, the MNC may be forced to pay the former saved tax liability plus
a penalty. The TA and the MNC negotiate about the applicable transfer price pn where pn
determines the subsequent tax payment. The tax authority can levy an additional penalty, which
is captured by the penalty factor δ ≥ 1. Furthermore, we assume the penalty to be linear, that
is δ multiplied with the evaded tax (Yitzhaki, 1974). Hence, in the case of a detected non-
compliance, the MNC faces the following payment:
SMNC = (t+h)qδ ·max{pr− pn,0},
which comprises the former saved tax payments and a penalty stipulated for the tax evasion.
Headquarters is interested in the global after-tax profit. The headquarters incorporates possi-
ble tax savings due to tax rate differentials as well as resulting penalties. Thus, headquarters
maximizes:
ΠMNC = q
[
(1− t−h)
(
a− 1
2
q
)
− (1− t)c+hpr
]
−SMNC.
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3.2 Tax Auditor
The TA is located in the high tax jurisdiction, i.e. in the home country of the domestic division.6
We do not explicitly model the incentive problem between the tax authority and the TA. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the incentive scheme is designed in a way that the TA
is solely interested in maximizing the additional tax revenues which he generates for the tax
authority. Thus, in contrast to the MNC, the TA does not take the additional penalty captured
by δ into account. However, the TA must allow the appraised appropriate mark-up on the
MNC’s marginal costs even while finding a non-compliance. Hence, the smallest transfer price
which can be enforced is pr. After negotiation with the MNC, the TA enforces the transfer price
pn. In the case of a detected non-compliance, the TA generates additional tax revenues:
STA = (t+h)q ·max{pr− pn,0}.
On the other hand, he faces personal audit costs, Ka > 0, if he conducts an audit. Throughout
the analysis we assume not prohibitively high audit cost.
We capture the TA’s decision whether to conduct an audit or not using a binary variable:
xa =

1 if an audit takes place,
0 if no audit is conducted.
Thus, the TA maximizes:
E
[
ΠTA
]
=

E
[
STA
]−Ka for xa = 1,
0 for xa = 0.
The TA’s decision whether to conduct an audit or not takes place after the MNC’s reporting
strategy was determined. In equilibrium, the TA may decide to conduct an audit with positive
probability. This audit probability is given by η .
6 We do not consider the TA in the low tax jurisdiction. The foreign TA anticipates that profits will be shifted into
his jurisdiction.
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3.3 Transfer Pricing Regimes
After an audit has taken place and non-compliance was detected the external transfer price is
adjusted. TSB in combination with a non-compliance supports the TA’s imputation of a reported
transfer price due to strong tax saving motives. This weakens the MNC’s bargaining power. This
is strongly supported by the empirical findings of Mills (1998). There remains no room for the
low cost MNC to persuade the TA to accept a transfer price other than one from the appraised
compliance range. Thus, the TA argues that marginal costs plus an appraised appropriate mark-
up, i.e. cL+mL, should be applied.7 When the MNC keeps TSB and reports a price belonging
to its true appraised compliance range, the MNC faces no transfer price adjustments in case of
an audit.
TSB does not necessarily indicate an aggressive transfer pricing behavior. In particular, some
profit shifting might be tacitly tolerated by governments to heighten its competitiveness com-
pared to other tax jurisdictions. Solely tax aggressive behavior is targeted. Hence, the TA
enforces pn = pr for a non-compliant, low cost MNC keeping TSB.
However, non-compliance can also be detected while the MNC keeps OSB. If OSB was found,
the use of a single transfer price for both the quantity decision as well as for tax purposes
strengthens the MNC’s bargaining power. In particular, OSB indicates that transfer prices are
driven by economic considerations rather than tax optimization (EY, 2001, 2003). The internal
price equals the external one. This might indicate that the upper bound of the appraised arm’s
length compliance range is in fact too low. For internal coordination while keeping OSB, the
MNC prefers a price above this range. In case of a litigation, the MNC has strong arguments
for setting its transfer price not only due to tax saving motives. The reported transfer price
serves for quantity decisions as well. Hence, the TA cannot provide sufficient evidence for tax
motivated non-compliance. Thus, the TA and the MNC negotiate about the applicable transfer
price. In particular, the TA and the MNC negotiate about the appropriate mark-up which might
7 Previous literature suggests that the TA enforces the internal transfer price for tax purposes as well. Since we
assume the TA to maximize additional tax revenues and we require pi ≤ pr this seems to be intuitive. However,
it is unreasonable that the arm’s length price should be undercut due to former tax saving activities. In fact, this
is some kind of worsening TSB in advance. Since we capture any penalty to be paid by the penalty factor δ we
exclude this additional punishment of using TSB.
12
be different from the appraised mark-up mL.8 The extent of the negotiated mark-up depends on
the TA’s bargaining power which is captured by the parameter γ ∈ [0,1]. The TA is interested
in enforcing a transfer price belonging to the appraised compliance range. However, the MNC
maximizes its overall after-tax profit. Hence, it is interested in a transfer price close to the
actually used one. Therefore, for a non-compliant MNC keeping OSB, the transfer price after
negotiation is pn = γ pr +(1− γ)pr.
The timing of the game is depicted in figure 2.
Nature assigns
type cH or cL,
the realization
is privately
observed by
MNC
t=0
MNC chooses
OSB vs. TSB
and decides
about pi and
pr
t=1
Domestic
division
chooses q
t=2
TA observes
pr and decides
whether to
conduct an
audit
t=3
After an audit
and detected
non-
compliance,
TA and MNC
negotiate
about the
transfer price
pn
t=4
Profits are
realized,
where
required
penalty is paid
in the
domestic
country
t=5
Figure 2: Timeline
8 Without loss of generality, the divisions do not incur any fixed cost in the model. Thus, the mark-up solely affects
the profit of the foreign division. According to the cost-plus method a mark-up on marginal costs is accepted.
Independent of the use of OSB or TSB or a detected non-compliance, the TA allows this appraised mark-up on
marginal costs. Hence, the MNC faces no risk of losing this surcharge.
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4 Equilibrium Analysis
The TA’s decision takes place after MNC has sent its transfer pricing report. Nevertheless, the
game may be seen as strategically ’simultaneous’ in the sense that the TA only observes the
outcome of the chosen reporting strategy. The strategy itself remains concealed (Crawford and
Sobel, 1982, p. 1433). Thus, we apply the weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) concept.
4.1 Internal Prices and Dominated Strategies
In the extensive form of the game, many of the strategies can be eliminated in advance, since
they are strictly dominated.9 A high cost type MNC keeps TSB with pr. Hence, the MNC
chooses its reported transfer price belonging to its compliance range. If an audit has taken
place, neither transfer pricing adjustments nor penalization occur. Hence, the MNC maximizes
its profits by decoupling its transfer prices for independent optimization of internal coordination
and tax minimization.
However, an MNC with low costs has an incentive to mimic the high cost firm, at least with
positive probability. Thus, the low cost MNC will set the reported transfer price equal to pr
or pr because every transfer price below pr reveals the MNC’s low marginal costs. Hence, for
pr = pr, the TA may conduct an audit as long as the audit costs are not prohibitively high.
With TSB, the internal transfer price includes an adjustment of marginal costs. In particular,
the MNC uses tax adjusted marginal costs as internal transfer price in case of compliance.
This price induces the domestic selling division to make the optimal quantity decision. Former
research has already shown the optimality of this quantity (Baldenius et al., 2004). In the case
of a reported transfer price not belonging to the compliance range the MNC takes into account
the potential costs of a transfer pricing audit. Hence, by considering a strategic TA, tax and
audit adjusted marginal costs are used for internal optimization. This finding is summarized in
lemma 1.
Lemma 1. When TSB are kept and the reported transfer price belongs to the compliance range
9 The proof is stated in the appendix.
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of the MNC, tax adjusted marginal costs c j, j = H,L, are adopted for internal coordination:
pi =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)c j−hpr
]
. (1)
When a low cost MNC keeps TSB and chooses a non-compliant reported transfer price, possible
payments due to detection are incorporated for internal coordination:
pi =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
. (2)
Proof. All proofs and thresholds are stated in the appendix.
For a compliant external transfer price with TSB, the internal price matches the findings of
Baldenius et al. (2004). When TSB with a non-compliant reported transfer price are used, the
internal transfer price additionally takes into account the potential audit. Hence, an MNC keeps
TSB tax aggessively will use tax and audit adjusted marginal costs for internal coordination.
We summarize the used transfer prices of possible and not strictly dominated strategy choices
in table 1.
MNC Accounting System Internal Transfer Price pi Transfer Price after
type and Transfer Pricing Negotiation pn
c = cH TSB with pr = pr piH = 11−t−h [(1− t)cH−hpr] pn = pr
c = cL TSB with pr = pr pi1 = 11−t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
pn = pr
TSB with pr = pr pi2 = 11−t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
pn = pr
OSB with pr = pr pi = pr pn = γ pr +(1− γ)pr
Table 1: Overview of possible transfer pricing choices
After all dominated strategies have been eliminated, the remaining game tree is as displayed in
figure 3.
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4.2 Equilibrium Strategies
In a world with taxes, the reduced game tree in figure 3 and table 1 reveal that an MNC with
high marginal costs cH prefers to set the internal transfer price below the marginal costs of the
foreign division. Moreover, the MNC uses TSB to decouple transfer prices used for internal and
tax purposes. In the case of a tax audit, the high cost type faces no risk of penalization since pr
is assumed to comply with the arm’s length principle. Hence, the TA never challenges a high
reported transfer price while finding high marginal costs during an audit.10 The MNC with low
marginal costs might prefer to use one of three potential strategies. First, the MNC with low
marginal costs can implement OSB and report a high transfer price. This distorts the MNC’s
quantity decision away from the optimal quantity. However, the MNC can shift some profits
of the domestic division to the foreign division and thus, save some tax payments. Second, the
MNC can use TSB with tax and audit adjusted marginal costs for internal quantity decisions
and a high reported transfer price. This allows the MNC to implement an optimal quantity and
shift profits from the high to the low tax jurisdiction. However, with TSB the MNC weakens
its bargaining power in case of an audit. As a consequence, if the TA conducts an audit the
penalty per unit sold of the final good is higher under TSB compared to the situation where
the MNC uses only OSB. Third, the MNC can use TSB with a reported transfer price that
complies with the arm’s length principle. Then the external transfer price is not only set due to
tax saving motives. While choosing a truthful report, the low cost type does not pretend facing
high marginal costs. Hence, the MNC is not mimicking the high cost type. It chooses pr as the
reported transfer price and an optimal decoupled internal transfer price. If the TA observes a
low reported transfer price, the TA never conducts an audit. The reason is that a low reported
transfer price can never lead to any revenue for the TA.
The following two propositions show how the TA’s audit costs Ka, the level of the penalty factor
δ and the bargaining power γ affect the chosen equilibrium strategies. The specific internal
transfer prices of table 1 are used in the propositions. The first proposition looks at low audit
costs of the TA while the second proposition deals with high audit costs.
10 In the following, we explictly point out while considering a high cost MNC. Otherwise, we discuss an MNC with
low marginal costs.
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Proposition 1. An MNC of type cH always chooses TSB with a reported transfer price pr and
uses tax adjusted marginal costs for internal coordination. For δ > δc and low audit costs
Ka < Ka1, the equilibrium strategies of an MNC with low marginal costs cL and the TA are as
follows:11
• In the case of γ < γδ , the MNC randomizes between TSB with pr and OSB with pr. OSB
is chosen with probability:
τ1,V =
Ka
(1−β )(t+h)(a− pr)γ(pr− pr) (3)
and TSB with probability 1− τ1,V . The TA conducts an audit with probability:
ηV =
1
(a− pr)[δ (t+h)γ(pr− pr)]
[
1− t−h
2
(p2i2− pr2)+ah(pr− pr)
+cL(1− t)(pr− pi2)+h(pr pi2− pr2)
]
.
(4)
• In the case of γ > γδ , the MNC randomizes between TSB with pr and TSB with pr. TSB
with pr are chosen with probability:
τ2,V I =
Ka
(1−β )(t+h)(a− pi1)(pr− pr) (5)
and TSB with pr with probability 1− τ2,V I . The TA audits a high reported transfer price
pr with audit probability:
ηV I =
h
δ (t+h)
. (6)
Proof. All proofs and thresholds are stated in the appendix.
The second proposition addresses the case of high audit costs for the TA. In this case, the TA
might conduct an audit with positive probability despite suffering from non negligible audit
costs.
Proposition 2. An MNC of type cH always chooses TSB with a reported transfer price pr and
uses tax adjusted marginal costs for internal purposes. For a high level of audit costs, the
equilibrium strategies of an MNC with low marginal costs cL and the TA are as follows:
• In the case of γ < γδ and Ka1 < Ka < Ka2,1, the MNC randomizes between TSB with pr
and OSB with pr. The MNC chooses OSB with probability:
τ1,IV =
Ka− (1−β )(t+h)(a− pi1)(pr− pr)
(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)[γ(a− pr)− (a− pi1)] (7)
11 Setting δ larger than δc simplifies the analysis. For δ < δc, Ka < Ka1, and γ < γδ , an equilibrium might occur in
which the MNC always keeps OSB with pr.
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and TSB with pr with probability 1−τ1,IV . The TA audits the reported transfer price with
probability:
ηIV =
1
δ (pr− pr)(t+h)
[
A−
√
A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2
]
(8)
with A := a(1− γ)(1− t−h)+ γ pr(1− t−h)+hpr− cL(1− t).
• In the case of γ > γδ and Ka1 < Ka < Ka2,2, the MNC randomizes between TSB with pr
and TSB with pr. Randomization probabilities are described in (5) and for the TA in (6).
Proof. All proofs and thresholds are stated in the appendix.
The findings of proposition 1 and 2 are illustrated in figure 4. The MNC never chooses OSB
when the bargaining power of the TA is above the threshold of γδ . Hence, the bargaining power
of the TA determines whether the reduced flexibility of OSB is outweighed by an improved
bargaining power of the MNC in case of a detected non compliance or not. The dark gray area
shows that for not prohibitively high audit costs the MNC always randomizes between the two
TSB strategies. So, the MNC randomizes between mimicking the high cost type and a truthful
report.
Figure 4: Equilibrium Analysis (plotted for a = 200,cH = 80,mH = 10,cL = 65,mL = 10, t =
0.2,β = 0.5, h = 0.25, and δ = 2.5)
When the TA’s bargaining power is high the TA can enforce his interests independent of MNC’s
accounting strategy. The advantage of OSB compared to TSB is lost. But if the TA’s bargaining
power is low, the MNC might randomize with OSB. However, keeping OSB is never chosen as
a pure strategy in equilibrium because the low cost type always has an incentive to deviate. If
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the audit costs for the TA are low, the MNC randomizes between OSB with pr and TSB with pr.
Due to the low audit costs, the MNC expects a frequent audit. Hence, it balances the conflicting
objectives while taking into account possible transfer pricing adjustments and penalties. For
smaller audit incentives of the TA, the reduced flexibility of OSB outweigh the increased risk
of penalization while keeping TSB with pr. That is, while auditors personal costs are high(light
gray area), the MNC randomizes between OSB and TSB with pr.
Proposition 1 and 2 highlight that for not prohibitively high audit costs, the MNC randomizes
with OSB as long as the bargaining power γ stays below its respective threshold.12 For almost
any level of audit costs and bargaining power, the MNC keeps TSB with a high transfer price
with positive probability. Solely, for a low bargaining power of the TA and low audit costs, the
MNC does not keep TSB with an untruthful report. In this case the MNC randomizes between
OSB and TSB with pr. Hence, in this case the MNC can be prevented from tax aggressive
behavior. With audit cost below Ka1 and γ above the threshold, the probability for TSB with pr
is low. If there are high audit costs, the probability for TSB with pr is higher.
From these reported results, we point out some economic implications.
At first, we are interested in the effects of the bargaining power. When the bargaining power
of the TA is high, the MNC randomizes between the two TSB strategies and does not choose
OSB. The reason is that the advantage of the bargaining power for the MNC is small and so, the
disadvantage of OSB in comparison to TSB is large. Therefore, the decoupling provides better
management incentives to ensure optimal quantity decisions.
Then, we are interested in the effects of the personal audit costs of the TA. For a decrease in the
audit costs, the TA conducts an audit more frequently. Hence, being tax aggressive becomes
more expensive for the MNC. Specifically, as shown in proposition 1 and illustrated in figure 4,
the MNC randomizes between TSB with pr and TSB with pr for a high bargaining power of the
TA. The probability of keeping TSB with pr decreases for declinig audit costs of the TA. This
is caused by the TA’s higher scrutiny. Then, keeping TSB with pr becomes more likely. This
reduces the MNC’s tax aggressiveness. For a low bargaining power of the TA, OSB becomes
12 The threshold γδ can be negative. Specifically, γδ is inversely U-shaped in the tax difference h. When γδ is
negative, OSB is no longer part of an equilibrium strategy. Then, the left part of figure 4 does not occur.
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more favorable. Thus, for high audit costs, the MNC randomizes between OSB and TSB with
pr. In this case, lower audit costs lead to a lower probability of keeping TSB with pr. For low
audit costs, a higher scrutiny by the TA induces the MNC to randomize between OSB and TSB
with pr. Keeping TSB with pr is not considered tax aggressive. Hence, for any level of the TA’s
bargaining power, an MNC becomes less tax aggressive for decreasing audit costs.
4.3 Properties of Equilibrium Strategies
Next to the level of the audit costs and the bargaining power of the TA, the tax difference
between the two jurisdictions influences the MNC’s willingness to keep TSB with the high
transfer price. As long as audit costs are not prohibitively high, the MNC tends to refrain from
keeping TSB with the high transfer price for a raise in the tax rate difference. In particular,
for an increase in the tax difference, the MNC keeps TSB and reports the high transfer price
with a smaller probability. This result is caused by the strategic behavior of the TA. For a low
bargaining power of the TA and low audit costs, the MNC does not keep TSB with the high
transfer price at all. Otherwise, the MNC keeps TSB with a high transfer price with positive
probability which declines for a raising tax difference. Specifically, a high tax difference implies
a high tax saving potential for the MNC. The TA is aware of the high tax saving potential.
Thus, he displays more scrutiny. This increases the MNC’s expected penalization cost which is
incorporated in the transfer pricing decision. In this situation, the weakened bargaining power
associated with TSB is particularly harmful for the MNC. In sum, for an increase in the tax
difference, the MNC is inclined to keep TSB with the high transfer price pr less often because
of the TA’s raised scrutiny. This finding is summarized in proposition 3 and illustrated in figure 5
for a high bargaining power of the TA.13
Proposition 3. For a high (low) bargaining power of the TA as well as not prohibitively high
audit costs, the MNC’s probability to keep TSB with the high transfer price pr decreases (does
not increase) for an increase in the tax difference h.
Next, we are interested in the effects of a change in the tax difference on the internal transfer
prices and the produced quantity. An increase in the tax difference h, makes shifting profit to
the low tax country more attractive. When the MNC keeps TSB, the reported transfer price is
13 Thus, figure 5 corresponds to the setting depicted in the right part of figure 4.
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Figure 5: Probability of TSB with pr considering the tax rate differential h (plotted for
a = 200,cH = 80,mH = 10,cL = 65,mL = 10, t = 0.2,β = 0.5, γ = 0.5, and δ = 2.5; For h ∈
[0,0.28], the thresholds Ka1 and Ka2,2 lie in the intervals [82.50,198.00] and [202.50,505.39],
respectively. The probability for the case Ka1 < Ka < Ka2,2 (Ka < Ka1) is depicted for Ka = 200
(Ka = 30).)
already set to optimize the tax payments. Then, a high cost type MNC can shift more profit
to the foreign division by producing and selling a higher quantity q. Increasing the quantity
also has an indirect effect on the MNC’s profit. The price per unit sold decreases and the
contribution margin per unit sold becomes smaller. However, for a higher tax difference, the
decrease in the contribution margin is outweighed by the positive effects of a higher quantity.
A low cost type MNC either aggressively reduces its tax payments by mimicking the high
cost type MNC or non-aggressively by reporting the highest appraised tax transfer price for
low marginal costs pr. A non-aggressive reporting strategy faces the same trade-off between a
smaller contribution margin and the direct effects of increasing the quantity as the high cost type
MNC. In addition to these two effects, an aggressive MNC also considers the raised scrutiny
of the TA associated with an increase in the tax difference. As discussed in proposition 3, the
MNC reduces the probability to keep TSB with a high transfer price. This anticipation of the
TA’s raised scrutiny allows an aggressive MNC to also beneficially raise its quantity for an
increase in the tax difference.
Proposition 4. For TSB and not prohibitively high audit costs, a raise in the tax difference h,
decreases the internal transfer prices and thus, increases the produced and sold quantity q of
the MNC.
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5 Conclusion
Former research has already shown that keeping OSB in markets with imperfect competition
might become optimal despite the MNC’s reduced flexibility in optimizing both internal deci-
sion making and tax payments. However, these results depend crucially on whether competitors
are able to observe when one transfer price is used to align conflicting objectives or not. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce a strategic tax auditor in a setting where the
MNC can choose between keeping OSB versus TSB. The findings illustrate that an MNC might
keep OSB in equilibrium. In particular, this is the case for a low bargaining power of the TA.
The findings of the equilibrium analysis show that the outcome of the game depends on a variety
of factors. Hence, it is not straightforward which equilibrium and which strategies occur. In
general, the conclusion of former research that TSB dominates OSB cannot be confirmed. In the
examined setting, the MNC faces a trade-off between flexibility and expected penalty payments.
By keeping TSB, an MNC can separately induce the optimal quantity decision and minimize tax
payments. However, in contrast to keeping OSB, an MNC suffers from a weakened bargaining
power. Thus, an MNC with TSB incurs higher penalty payments in the case of a detected
non-compliance during a tax audit. The costs associated with TSB exceed the benefits from
flexibility if the MNC has a good bargaining power while keeping OSB. Then, an MNC keeps
OSB.
Another relevant aspect is the tax spread between the foreign and the domestic country. The
findings show that when this parameter increases MNC’s tax aggressiveness decreases. Specif-
ically, we find that the probability of keeping TSB with a transfer pricing report which aims
to minimize taxes decreases for an increase in the tax difference between the jurisdictions. On
the one hand, as expected, a high tax difference yields a high tax saving potential. By keeping
TSB with a high transfer pricing report, the MNC can exploit the high tax difference by shift-
ing profit to the low tax country. However, the TA is aware of the MNC’s incentive to shift
profits. Thus, the high tax saving potential invites increasing scrutiny by the TA. This raises
the expected costs stemming from the weakened bargaining power while keeping TSB with a
transfer price that does not comply with the arm’s length principle. As a consequence, with an
increasing tax difference profit shifting becomes riskier and less attractive for the MNC. Then,
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the MNC increasingly refrains from keeping TSB with a high reported transfer price.
These results highlight that tax regulation and enforcement affect taxpayer’s behavior in a non-
trivial way. In particular, an MNC’s choice of keeping OSB versus TSB and the related potential
tax saving behavior can be influenced by tax legislation and enforcement. This paper illustrates
that both the level of audit costs of the TA as well as the TA’s bargaining power in case of
a detected non-compliance determine the MNC’s tax related equilibrium behavior. As a con-
sequence, the findings are highly relevant for a number of institutional players, for example,
legislators, tax authorities, MNCs, as well as supranational units like the EU and the OECD.
24
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof regarding Dominated Strategies
The following strategies are dominated:
• When the MNC reports pr = pr, the MNC incurs the highest possible tax payments. Thus,
a tax audit cannot result in additional tax revenues. Consequently, the TA never audits a
low reported transfer price.
• For pr > pr, the TA can claim a high fee without costs. Thus, setting pr > pr is never
chosen by the MNC.
• The TA cannot generate any additional tax revenues in a tax audit when the MNC is of
type c = cH and chooses a pr ≤ pr. Thus, the MNC can keep TSB without any additional
costs. The MNC minimizes the tax payments by setting pr = pr.
• The TA cannot generate any additional tax revenues in a tax audit when the MNC is of
type c = cL and chooses a pr ≤ pr. Thus, the MNC can keep TSB without any additional
costs. The MNC sets the internal transfer price so that the profit is maximized. Without
any additional costs, this strategy results in a better quantity decision by the domestic
division than under OSB with pr ≤ pr. Thus, OSB with pr ≤ pr is strictly dominated by
TSB with pr = pr.
• For TSB with a pr ∈
(
pr, pr
)
, the MNC of type c = cL prefers one of the not included
corner solutions. Thus, using pr = pr (pr = pr) strictly dominates the use of a pr close to
pr = pr (pr = pr).
• For a high prohibitive price a, the MNC of type c = cL keeping OSB prefers the transfer
price pr = pr to any pr ∈
(
pr, pr
)
.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 1
This proof is organized in two steps. First, the case is considered in which the MNC reports a
transfer price that is acceptable for its marginal costs. Second, the case is considered in which
a low cost type MNC mimics a high cost MNC.
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Step 1: For an MNC of type c j with j = H,L, the TA does not contest a reported transfer price
that belongs to the range [0, pr] or
[
0, pr
]
, respectively. Thus, the MNC’s profit with marginal
costs c j is determined by
ΠMNC(pi, pr) = (a− pi)
[
(1− t−h)
(
a− 1
2
(a− pi)
)
− (1− t)c j +hpr
]
. (9)
The FOC of equation 9 with respect to pr is (a− pi)h > 0. The Hessian matrix of equation 9
is not strictly definite. Hence, the MNC prefers to set pr as large as possible, i.e. pr (pr) for
c j = cH (c j = cL).
FOCpi :−(1− t−h)pi+(1− t)c j−hpr = 0
SOCpi :−(1− t−h)< 0
Thus, the FOC for pi determines a local maximum:
pi =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)c j−hpr
]
.
Step 2: For an MNC of type cL, the TA might want to contest a reported transfer price that
belongs to the range
(
pr, pr
]
. Then, the MNC’s profit is determined by
ΠMNC(pi, pr) = (a− pi)
[
(1− t−h)
(
a− 1
2
(a− pi)
)
− (1− t)cL+hpr
]
(10)
−ηδ (t+h)(a− pi)(pr− pr).
The FOC of equation 10 with respect to pr is (a− pi) [h−ηδ (t+h)]. The Hessian matrix of
equation 10 is not strictly definite. Hence, the MNC prefers to either set pr as large or as small
as possible. The case in which the MNC wants to set a small transfer price is already described
in step 1. Thus, we next consider the case in which pr is preferred.
FOCpi :−(1− t−h)pi+(1− t)cL−hpr +ηδ (t+h)(pr− pr) = 0
SOCpi :−(1− t−h)< 0
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Thus, the FOC for pi determines a local maximum:
pi =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2
The following proof is organized in several steps. For all steps, let ρ be the TA’s belief that
an MNC reporting a high transfer price, pr = pr, has high marginal costs, c = cH . In addition,
τ = (τ1,τ2,τ3) is the randomized strategy of the MNC for c= cL. τ1 (τ2/τ3) denotes the MNC’s
chosen probability to set OSB with a high reported transfer price pr = pr (TSB with a high
reported transfer price pr = pr/TSB with a low reported transfer price pr = pr). When observing
a high reported transfer price pr = pr, the TA chooses to (not) conduct an audit with probability
η (1−η). Note that an MNC with c = cH always chooses TSB with a high reported transfer
price pr = pr and the TA never audits a low reported transfer price pr = pr.
Step 1: Under which conditions does the MNC randomize between OSB with pr = pr and TSB
with pr = pr? The MNC randomizes the strategies OSB with a high transfer price and TSB with
a high transfer price if and only if, the expected profit of these two strategies are the same and
this expected profit is higher than the expected profit obtainable with TSB with a low transfer
price:
E [Π | c = cL,OSB, pr = pr] = ηΠMNC6 +(1−η)ΠMNC7 ,
E [Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr] = ηΠMNC3 +(1−η)ΠMNC4 ,
ηΠMNC6 +(1−η)ΠMNC7 = ηΠMNC3 +(1−η)ΠMNC4
⇐⇒ η = 1
δ (pr− pr)(t+h)
[
A±
√
A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2
]
,
where A := a(1− γ)(1− t− h)+ γ pr(1− t− h)+ hpr− cL(1− t). We assume throughout the
paper, that a is sufficiently large so that A > 0 and A±
√
A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2 > 0. Thus, the
MNC is indifferent between OSB with pr = pr and TSB with pr = pr for
ηIV :=
1
δ (pr− pr)(t+h)
[
A−
√
A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2
]
> 0.
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ηIV is smaller than 1 if and only if
δ ≥ A−
√
A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2
(t+h)(pr− pr) =: δ4. (11)
In addition, E [Π | c = cL,OSB, pr = pr]≥ E
[
Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr
]
if and only if
ηIV ≤ ηV ⇐⇒ δ4 ≤ δc,
where δc is defined in step 2.
For observing a high reported transfer price, the TA wants to randomize between conducting
and not conducting an audit if and only if
τ1 =
Ka− (1−β )(t+h)(a− pi1)(pr− pr)
(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)[γ(a− pr)− (a− pi1)] := τ1,IV .
τ1,IV is positive and smaller than 1 if and only if Ka1 < Ka < Ka2,1, where
Ka1 := (1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)γ(a− pr) (12)
and
Ka2,1 := (a− pi1)(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr). (13)
In sum, randomizing between OSB with pr = pr and TSB with pr = pr can occur for Ka1 <
Ka < Ka2,1, δ > δ4, and δ4 ≤ δc. In this case, τ2 = 1− τ1,IV , η = ηIV , and ρ = β constitutes a
weak PBE.
Step 2: Under which conditions does the MNC randomize between OSB with pr = pr and TSB
with pr = pr? The MNC randomizes the strategies OSB with a high transfer price and TSB with
a low transfer price if and only if, the expected profit of these two strategies are the same and
this expected profit is higher than the expected profit obtainable with TSB with a high transfer
price:
E [Π | c = cL,OSB, pr = pr] = ηΠMNC6 +(1−η)ΠMNC7 ,
E
[
Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr
]
=ΠMNC5 ,
ηΠMNC6 +(1−η)ΠMNC7 =ΠMNC5
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⇐⇒ η = 1
(a− pr)[δ (t+h)γ(pr− pr)][
1− t−h
2
(p2i2− pr2)+ah(pr− pr)
+cL(1− t)(pr− pi2)+h(pr pi2− pr2)
]
:= ηV .
We assume throughout the paper, that a is sufficiently large so that ηV > 0. ηV is smaller than
1 if and only if
δ ≥ 1
(a− pr)[(t+h)γ(pr− pr)] (14)[
1− t−h
2
(p2i2− pr2)+ah(pr− pr)
+cL(1− t)(pr− pi2)+h(pr pi2− pr2)
]
:= δc.
In addition, E [Π | c = cL,OSB, pr = pr]≥ E [Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr] if and only if
ηIV ≤ ηV ⇐⇒ δ4 ≤ δc,
where δ4 is defined in (11).
For observing a high reported transfer price, the TA wants to randomize between conducting
and not conducting an audit if and only if
τ1 =
Ka
(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)γ(a− pr) := τ1,V .
τ1,V is positive. In addition, it is smaller than 1 if and only if Ka ≤ Ka1 of (12).
In sum, randomizing between OSB with pr = pr and TSB with pr = pr can occur for Ka < Ka1,
δ > δc, and δ4 ≤ δc. In this case, τ3 = 1− τ1,V , η = ηV , and ρ = β constitutes a weak PBE.
Step 3: Under which conditions does the MNC randomize between TSB with pr = pr and TSB
with pr = pr? The MNC randomizes the strategies TSB with a high transfer price and TSB with
a low transfer price if and only if, the expected profit of these two strategies are the same and
this expected profit is higher than the expected profit obtainable with OSB with a high transfer
price:
E [Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr] = ηΠMNC3 +(1−η)ΠMNC4 ,
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E
[
Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr
]
=ΠMNC5 ,
ηΠMNC3 +(1−η)ΠMNC4 =ΠMNC5
⇐⇒ η ∈
{
h
δ (t+h)
,
h
δ (t+h)
+
2 [a(1− t−h)− cL(1− t)]
δ (pr− pr)(t+h)
}
.
We assume throughout the paper, that a is big. Conducting an audit is associated with costs for
the TA. Thus, the TA audits with probability
ηV I =
h
δ (t+h)
> 0.
ηV I is smaller than 1.
In addition, E [Π | c = cL,T SB, pr = pr]≥ E [Π | c = cL,OSB, pr = pr] if and only if
ηV ≤ ηV I ⇐⇒ δc ≤ ht+h .
For observing a high reported transfer price, the TA wants to randomize between conducting
and not conducting an audit if and only if
τ2 =
Ka
(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)(a− pi1) := τ2,V I.
τ2,V I is positive. In addition, it is smaller than 1 if and only if Ka < Ka2,2, where
Ka2,2 := (a− pi1)(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr). (15)
In sum, randomizing between TSB with pr = pr and TSB with pr = pr can occur for Ka < Ka2,2
and δc ≤ ht+h . In this case, τ3 = 1− τ2,V I , η = ηV I , and ρ = β constitutes a weak PBE.
Step 4: What are the properties of δc and δ4?
For 0 < γ < γδ , we obtain δc > δ4, δ4 < 1, and δc > ht+h , where
γδ :=
1
2h(a− pr)(pr− pr) (16)
[
2ah(pr− pr)− (1− t−h)(pr2− p2i2)+2(1− t)cL(pr− pi2)−2h(pr− pi2 pr)
]
.
For γδ < γ ≤ 1, we obtain δc < ht+h and δc < δ4 < ht+h is smaller than 1. Thus, for γδ < γ ≤ 1,
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δc is also smaller than 1.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
For γ > γδ and Ka < Ka2,2, the MNC keeps TSB with pr with probability τ2,V I and uses the
internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηV Iδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
=
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
.
d pi1
dh
=
1
(1− t−h)2
[
(1− t)(−cL− pr)
]
< 0 (17)
Therefore,
dτ2,V I
dh
=
∂τ2,V I
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂τ2,V I
∂ pi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
d pi1
dh︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0.
For γ < γδ and Ka ∈ (Ka1,Ka2,1), the MNC keeps TSB with pr with probability τ2,IV and uses
the internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηIVδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
.
∂τ2,IV
∂h
= (−1) · [(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)[a− pi1− γ(a− pr)]]−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·
Ka
[
(1−β )(pr− pr)[a− pi1− γ(a− pr)]
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0.
∂τ2,IV
∂ pi1
= (−1) · [(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)[a− pi1− γ(a− pr)]]−2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·
(1−β )(t+h)(pr− pr)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(Ka1−Ka)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 for Ka∈(Ka1,Ka2,1)
> 0.
d pi1
dh
=
1
(1− t−h)2
[
(1− t−h) (18)
[
A(a− pr)(1− γ)
(
A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2
)− 12]−√A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2].
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For A > 0 and A2− (pr− cL)2(1− t)2, d pi1dh is negative. In sum,
dτ2,IV
dh
=
∂τ2,IV
∂h︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂τ2,IV
∂ pi1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
d pi1
dh︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0.
For γ < γδ and Ka < Ka1, the MNC keeps TSB with pr with probability 0.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 4
A high cost type MNC uses the internal transfer price
piH =
1
1− t−h [(1− t)cH−hpr] .
d piH
dh
= (−1) 1
(1− t−h)2 [(1− t)mH ]< 0.
A low cost type MNC keeping TSB with pr uses the internal transfer price
pi2 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
.
d pi2
dh
= (−1) 1
(1− t−h)2 [(1− t)mL]< 0.
For γ > γδ , a low cost type MNC keeping TSB with pr uses the internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηV Iδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
=
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr
]
.
According to equation 17 d pi1dh is negative.
For γ < γδ , a low cost type MNC keeping TSB with pr uses the internal transfer price
pi1 =
1
1− t−h
[
(1− t)cL−hpr +ηIVδ (t+h)(pr− pr)
]
.
According to equation 18 d pi1dh is negative.
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